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 SPECIAL This Common Inheritance:
 COMMENT
 Green idealism versus Tory pragmatism
 I. THE WHITE PAPER: 'THIS COMMON INHERITANCE: BRITAIN'S ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY'
 'This Common Inheritance: Britain's Environmental Strategy' (henceforth TCI) is
 an important document in British politics. It is the first comprehensive
 inter-departmental review of Britain's environmental policies. It marks the
 Conservative Party's first real engagement with the agenda of the Green
 movement. TCI is certainly presented as a major new departure in politics:
 There are moments in history when apparently disparate forces or issues come
 together and take shape. Almost half a century ago that was true of arguments
 about the welfare state. In the last decade, the case for market economics has
 emerged, coherent and formidable, as a blueprint for prosperity and a guarantee
 of freedom. Today, it is the environment that captures headlines and excites
 public concern (TCI, p. 8).
 TCI explores the possibility of a more caring and less strident form of
 Conservatism and, although it was prepared under Mrs Thatcher's premiership, it
 may help define Tory ideology post-Thatcher.
 We need to examine the terms on which TCI engages with Green issues and
 explore the ways in which the other fundamental commitments of the
 Conservative Party shape the way it meets the environmental challenge. Owens
 (1986, p. 96) has written of 'fundamental differences in philosophy between
 conservatives and more "radical" environmentalists on allocation of resources,
 property rights, the role of market[s] and the value of collective as opposed to
 individual action' which mean that "'Greening the Tories" is in this sense a
 contradiction in terms.' If Owens is right, then, we ought to be able to show how
 these contradictions appear in TCI.
 An examination of the 'structures of negotiation' (Keams, 1984) in proposals for
 managing the environment is perhaps one area where human geographers in
 particular may make a contribution to the discussion of green issues within the
 subject (Simmons, 1990). Simmons (1989, pp. 391-396), for example, has set out
 some very stimulating speculations about the way society might respond to
 environmental problems, but these need to be taken further through a consideration
 of the political context in which they may be pursued. On the other hand,
 Johnson's (1989) essentialist account of both capitalism and nature and their
 inherent opposition appears to preclude any examination of specific proposals short
 of global socialist revolution. It is perhaps more constructive to work from more
 widely-shared political goals and to document how theirpursuit necessarily entails
 more radical policies if they are to be realized (see Ryle, 1988). In this spirit, we
 might consider the commitments, contradictions and limitations of the British
 Government's new environmental strategy. We can look at moral, economic and
 political aspects of TCI.
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 II. A GREEN TORY MORALITY?
 The possibility for recognizing a clear responsibility for the environment while
 remaining committed to economic growth is basic to the Conservative Party's
 thinking on the environment. In this, they have drawn comfort from the whole
 debate about sustainable development. In doing so, however, they have failed, or
 so I am going to suggest, to take seriously the moral arguments about development
 which underpin much of this work.
 Work on sustainable development is rooted, first, in the idea of there being a
 recognizable global interest in ecological questions. Where the Brandt Commission
 (1980, 1983) reported that the countries of the world collectively had an interest in
 economic recovery and the Palme Commission (International Commission on
 Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982) documented a global interest in
 disarmament and world peace, the Brundtland Commission (World Commission
 on Environment and Development, 1987) reported to the United Nations in Our
 Common Future (henceforth OCF) that there was a global interest in conservation.
 If we are, as a matter of inter-generational equity, to bequeath to our successors the
 potential for a quality of life equal to our own, then, we need to pay attention to the
 ecological sustainability of existing economic systems.
 In one sense, this is nothing new, since the global interest in controlling
 pollution is set out in many ecodoomwatch works. But works such as Global 2000
 (Council on Environmental Quality, 1982) which urged economic restraint in the
 rich countries to control pollution and reduce global inequality (Council on
 Environmental Quality, 1981) were not welcome reading for right-of-centre
 governments committed to freer markets and more rapid growth. The Reagan
 Government chose to let Global 2000 lie (McCormick, 1989, p. 173).
 The second important similarity between the three U.N. commissions I have
 mentioned is that they have all shown that the global interest they identify is
 compatible with economic growth in both rich and poor countries. Brandt claimed
 to show that Keynesian expansion in the North would create markets for the South
 which in turn would create the demand to justify the expansion in the North. Palme
 asserted that the arms race was both unnecessary and economically wasteful in
 both North and South. Now Brundtland suggests that conservation is a global
 interest which similarly will allow economic growth in both rich and poor
 countries.
 OCF follows the World Conservation Strategy (International Union for the
 Conservation of Nature, 1980; Dasmann, 1985) in treating conservation not as an
 end in itself but as a means to an end - the preservation of genetic diversity against
 the background of changing human needs. Sustainable economic growth, in these
 terms, implies the preservation of diversity and the potential for future growth.
 Now, while this approach does not address the 'political forces behind
 unsustainable practices' (Redclift, 1987, p. 21), it at least recognizes that the
 transformation of the natural world is intrinsic to economic development, and it
 offers a yardstick with which we may measure the suitability of alternative
 development paths. Questions about the relative rates of desirable economic
 growth in North and South are basically questions about the acceptable distribution
 of the world's resources between the two. Buchanan (1973) quite correctly made
 the relationship between environment and resources the starting point for his
 discussion of the world population problem, and the basis for his contention that
 restraint in the North would have greater effect on the environment than fertility
 control in the South, since it would be more conservative of resources.
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 The third strand in this new thinking about sustainable development is that
 it sees poverty in the South as a major cause of environmental deterioration,
 suggesting with Simon (1981) that people are the ultimate resource, and that
 '[i]mprovements in education, health and nutrition allow them to better use
 the resources they command, to stretch them further' (OCF, p. 95). Investments in
 human resources can, then, become the core of a strategy which emphasizes the
 importance of economic security to correct environmental management. Putting
 poor people first, it is argued, will enable them to adopt a longer-term perspective
 on their use of resources: 'Contrary to popular professional prejudice, there is
 mounting evidence that when poor people have secure rights and adequate stocks
 of assets to deal with contingencies, they tend to take a long view, holding on
 tenaciously to land, protecting and saving trees and seeking to provide for their
 children' (Chambers, 1988, p. 3). It is economic insecurity which forces poor
 people to export primary products and cash crops at the expense of meeting
 subsistence needs and ensuring ecological sustainability.
 TCI takes up some of these moral concerns. It notes that people are possessed of
 an 'intense hope that we can pass on what we value most about our own heritage to
 our children' (p. 8). It repeats the argument about the compatibility of economic
 growth and environmental protection in both rich and poor countries. It commits
 the Government to the principle of sustainable development which 'means handing
 down to successive generations not only man-made wealth (such as buildings,
 roads and railways) but also natural wealth, such as clean and adequate water
 supplies, good arable land, a wealth of wildlife and ample forests' (p. 47). The
 report catalogues the Government's membership of various bodies promoting
 sustainable development.
 TCI says very little about the relation of economic development to
 environmental security. It does not commit the Government to easing the access of
 third world producers to British markets. It does not commit the Government to
 meeting internationally agreed targets about the share of Gross Domestic Product
 to be allocated to development aid. It makes no mention of restricting the export of
 armaments to poor countries. Nothing is said about the 'depressing effect of [food]
 surpluses on world markets and consequent impact on developing countries' (OCF,
 p. 122) and, while developing countries are reminded of the need to adopt policies
 for 'handling expenditure issues, creating conditions which favour overseas
 investment and the private sector, minimising movements of capital abroad,
 encouraging exports and dealing with debt' (TCI, p. 47), nothing is said about
 restricting the play of commercial forces in poor countries in the interest of equity:
 In many countries where land is very unequally distributed land reform is a basic
 requirement. Without it, institutional and policy changes meant to protect the
 resource base can actually promote inequalities by shutting the poor off from
 resources and by favouring those with large farms, who are better able to obtain
 the limited credit and services available (OCF, p. 141).
 The global perspective in TCI relates more to the globalization of problems than
 of responsibilities. The international dimension of the report comes from the
 observation that 'in a very short time, human activity has become so varied and
 complex that it is having effects not only at local and national level, but on the
 whole world itself' (TCI, p. 9). This compromises the Government's professed
 commitment to inter-generational equity:
 We must put a proper value on the natural world: it would be odd to cherish a
 Constable but not the landscape he depicted. The foundation stone of all the
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 policies in this White Paper is our responsibility to future generations to preserve
 and enhance the environment and our planet (TCI, p. 10).
 In fact, and the reference to Constable implicitly concedes as much, the Report
 defends the local environment as an amenity value (heritage) and expresses worry
 about economic growth in the poor countries lest it have disastrous consequences
 for the global environment. Nowhere does the report address questions of
 international equity. When the report speaks of leaving a decent environment to
 our descendants, that 'our' is already structured by class, race and gender in ways
 which define the inheritance in terms of property rather than equity. The possibility
 of passing to our direct kith and kin an environment which would support a
 lifestyle similar to our own appears under threat and it is this propertied inheritance
 which the Report seeks to secure. Our own children's ability to make a living
 seems to be compromised by global pollution. Our own children's right to enjoy
 the landscapes of Constable seems to be compromised by the explosion of
 day-trippers, the factory-farming of the countryside and the general deterioration in
 the heritage leisure amenity. Here is the intergenerational equity which is the
 central concern of TCI.
 While not wishing to decry the morality of wishing to do well for one's children,
 a little more equity within generations might be a more noble goal. And there is, of
 course, so much more to green morality even than equity. The Report never
 broaches the question of respect for life tout court. There is nothing here on
 vegetarianism. There is no attempt to ground a moral purpose in the contemplation
 of our place within the web of nature. Listen instead to all that is implied in the
 German Green Party's appeal to 'inheritance':
 According to their own statements, they [the establishment parties in Bonn] are
 leading us to a hopeless choice between Harrisburg and Hiroshima. The
 worldwide ecological crisis worsens from day to day: natural resources become
 more scarce; chemical waste dumps are subjects of scandal after scandal; whole
 species of animals are exterminated; entire varieties of plants become extinct;
 rivers change slowly into sewers; and humans verge on spiritual and intellectual
 decay in the midst of a mature, industrial, consumer society. It is a dismal
 inheritance we are imposing on future generations (Spretnak & Capra, 1985, p.
 28).
 III. A GREEN TORY ECONOMICS ?
 When TCI speaks of placing a proper value on the natural world, this value is to be
 conceived in economic rather than moral terms. Or, to put the most favourable
 gloss on this reduction, the only reliable way of valuing things in a market
 economy is by monetizing their worth. Because the market does not work properly
 in costing positive and negative externalities, our moral valuation and the
 prevailing price of things does not match. If only it cost polluters something closer
 to the ethical value we place on the environment to damage it, then, either they
 would desist, or we could use polluters' payments to clean up the environment as
 we go along. Such, at least, was the argument of the report which the Department
 of the Environment commissioned on market-based approaches to environmental
 regulation (Pearce, Markandya & Barbier, 1989).
 The Government is against regulations which tell individuals and companies
 what they can and can not do. Instead, it prefers 'working with the grain of the
 market' and using 'various forms of pollution charges, as well as taxes and other
 economic instruments, all designed to enlcourage customers and producers to
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 behave in ways which benefit the environment' (TCI, p. 14). In general, the
 Government believes in the 'polluter pays' principle where an economic sector is
 taxed to support the work of the independent regulatory body which will police the
 sector and ensure that any environmental damage is corrected. The Government
 can only claim, as it does, that this does not amount to a license to pollute since,
 despite its general remarks, it also contemplates quite extensive regulation. TCI
 reports that: 'Where there are significant risks of damage to the environment, the
 Government will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the use of
 potentially dangerous pollutants even where scientific knowledge is not conclusive,
 if the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies' (p. 11). And, when looking at
 Britain's environmental achievements, TCI remarks that 'Britain led the world in
 smoke control. The Clean Air Acts of 1956 and 1968 have prevented many
 thousands of premature deaths from bronchial illness and changed our cities for the
 cleaner and better' (p. 146). The Government is also considering banning the sale
 of certain fuels in smoke control areas. In these ways, the Government can clearly
 claim that it is not offering industry a license to pollute, but it can hardly be said to
 be working with the grain of the market in doing so.
 There is nothing essentially free-market about the use of independent regulatory
 bodies to police pollution. It matters little who owns the enterprise which is doing
 the polluting when there is an independent regulatory body. Yet TCI suggests
 otherwise. Speaking of the water industry, it notes that: 'Investment in cleaning up
 our rivers and beaches was held back for years by constraints on public
 expenditure under successive Governments. It took the privatization of the water
 industry to allow the market to help' (p. 14). The newly privatized water
 companies are being forced to clean up the environment through a combination of
 EC regulations and the attentions of the new National Rivers Authority: 'The
 Government has given the NRA wide powers to enable it to be a tough and
 effective regulator' (TCI, p. 168).
 None of these advantages flowed directly from privatization. The Government
 could have set up the NRA before now. It could have allowed the old water
 authorities to raise the revenue necessary (through loans and higher charges) for
 dealing with pollution. In fact, the private sector has hardly come unbidden into
 this field. First, the Government improved the credit-worthiness of the water
 companies by wiping out much of their indebtedness. Second, the Government set
 a pricing structure for the new private water companies which guaranteed revenue
 growth outstripping inflation with prices reflecting any new EC regulations. These
 industries are not being exposed to market forces, they are being protected from
 the market. Nothing, other than the political costs of doing so, prevented the
 Government from offering the same latitude to the earlier publically-owned water
 companies. Price regulation, rather than markets, will always be necessary in this
 field since water provision tends towards a natural monopoly (Kearns, 1987).
 There is no intrinsic opposition between markets and planning (Hindess, 1987).
 All forms of private property require a certain level of collective provision for
 them to be enjoyed. At the very least, the legal and police systems must define and
 protect property entitlements and the state must issue and support a national
 currency and invest in infrastructure such as transport. There are, however,
 particular sets of circumstances where markets fail to deliver either efficiency or
 equity. Where people's initial property entitlements are widely different, as they
 are in Britain today (Townsend, 1979), markets will probably reinforce that
 inequality since the desperation of the poor to acquire basic goods gives owners of
 capital a very powerful weapon which is in no way reciprocal (Roemer, 1988;
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 Baker, 1987). Furthermore, where uncosted externalities, natural monopolies and
 imperfect information prevail, as they do in the case of many environmental
 questions, markets can hardly be relied upon for efficiency and equity.
 TCI argues that externalities will only be fully costed when all the crucial
 elements are in private hands, for then there is a clear propertied interest which
 will defend the environment. Consequently, the Report claims that 'Privatization is
 an important force serving to promote market transparency' (p. 273). Yet private
 enterprise is interested in short-term profits, and thus has only a weak interest in
 long-term ecological sustainability. Only regulation of the terms of the lease of
 resources to private capital could ensure a long-term perspective is taken but again
 that is to sell the pass on the market itself policing resource use.
 Natural monopolies result from the level and inflexibility of capital investment
 in any environmental services, such as water supply, sewerage, etc. Without
 regulation, these become merely an occasion to print money through soaraway
 prices. People desperately need these services and generally have only one
 possible supply. Not privatization, but regulation, is needed to protect the
 consumer here.
 Environmental information is not widely disseminated and is frequently
 produced and owned by the very groups wanting to engage in polluting activities.
 As Bowers (1990) has pointed out, at the time of damage, the full implications of
 many pollutants was not known. Prior investigation (as with medicines), rather
 than retrospective evaluation, is needed. The individual consumer quite simply
 does not have the possibility of researching all the products they use each day.
 Government-sponsored research coupled with strict controls on which materials
 are licensed for use would go a lot further than eco-labelling, which is the
 Government's preferred solution (TCI, p. 222).
 The fundamental difficulty with the Government's position is that it has an
 ideological problem with the whole idea of regulation. TCI is shrill in its
 denunciation of regulation, yet it actually proposes quite a bit of it. However, TCI
 also promises that the Government will aim to proceed by voluntary agreement at
 both national and international levels, and that it will do nothing to damage the
 international competitiveness of British agriculture and industry. For all the fine
 rhetoric about sustainable development, economic growth will continue along its
 present tracks until such time as the whole world comes to its collective sense;
 there is to be no unilateral greenery here. For example, in the long run, the cost of
 energy must rise if industry is to be encouraged to use it more sparingly, and thus
 help combat global warming, but:
 Long term measures affecting the relative price of energy can only sensibly be
 taken when competitor countries are prepared to take similar action. Unilateral
 action by Britain would do little to influence global warming. It would have a
 damaging impact on activity and employment in the energy-intensive sectors,
 relative to our competitors, to little purpose. In the immediate future the
 reduction of inflation is of overriding importance. Given this, and our best
 estimate of how long it will take to achieve an international consensus, tax or
 other measures directly raising the relative price of energy outside the transport
 sector will not be introduced in the next few years (TCI, p. 69).
 The voluntary principle and commercial viability come higher on the
 Government's set of priorities than does meeting the environmental crisis. With
 these as constraints on the process of giving the environment an economic value,
 we can be sure that no radical restructuring is contemplated.
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 IV. A GREEN TORY POLITICS?
 The same contradiction between the immediate need to manage a competitive
 economy of the old sort and the long-term goal of environmentally-sound
 development compromises the Government's conception of what Green politics
 involves. The German Green Party tells us that 'Our policies are guided by
 long-term visions of the future and are founded on four basic principles: ecology,
 social responsibility, grassroots democracy and nonviolence' (Spretnak & Capra,
 1985, p. 28). We need to think about why these commitments are necessary. Bahro
 once described the Green political process thus:
 In the richest, industrially over-developed countries of the West a fundamental
 opposition is growing - above all in the diverse forms of the new social
 movements. It is reacting to the now clearly and markedly self-destructive,
 outwardly murderous and inwardly suicidal character of our industrial
 civilization, and to its institutional system which is geared to continuing in the
 same old way. What makes this opposition fundamental is above all the fact that
 it throws into question both the material foundation and its counterpart in our
 basic attitudes which are oriented towards possessions and having. It gives
 expression to the very obvious truth that we shall only survive if we equip
 ourselves to live differently than we have up till now. The Greens see
 themselves as the parliamentary arm of this fundamental opposition movement
 (Bahro, 1986, p. 11).
 Yet, the Conservative Government understands: by ecology, pollution control
 which does not threaten profits or competitiveness; by social responsibility, the
 voluntary exercise of choice by informed consumers; by grassroots democracy,
 voluntary organizations and minimal local government; and by nonviolence,
 citizen acquiescence in central government's legitimate exercise of a monopoly of
 force. It is not serious about abolishing armies, combating centralization or
 empowering citizens against the state.
 Even to consider such a political agenda makes the rather obvious point that the
 Conservative Party, and indeed the Labour Party, are far from being anarchists. No
 surprise there, but what we must not lose sight of is the fact that their distance from
 Green politics measures their unwillingness to place the environment at the top of
 the political agenda. When difficulties arise, the Government's loyalties lie with
 economic growth. Yet the Green message is that growth of the present kind is what
 got us into this mess in the first place and, consequently, that more than mere
 tinkering is required.
 There is, however, a clear political agenda in the 'greening' of the Tories. First,
 the environment is presented as a leisure amenity to be enjoyed by leisured
 consumers. Second, privatization effectively offloads environmental protection
 away from the public budget; 'depoliticizing' the environment in some way.
 Private companies are to be led gently to use tax money and consumer charges to
 spend more on cleaning up the environment. At least the Government will no
 longer be seen to be directly responsible for their failures or for the inflation in
 costs which will inevitably result. Third, the voluntary principles and the
 championing of consumer sovereignty further depoliticizes the environmental
 issue. Eco-labelling will give the people the choice. If consumers persist in buying
 dirty products, then the fault will lie with them. The Government will have passed
 the buck. Fourth, and behind all this, vested interests will continue to have
 privileged access to the policy makers in the name of economic growth. Consider,
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.140 on Tue, 14 Jan 2020 09:33:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 370 Special comment
 for example, the intellectual somersaults required to reconcile motorway building
 with the Green agenda. TCI reports the Government opposed to letting traffic
 congestion find its own level (p. 118) while also believing that car ownership is a
 fundamental right (p. 72), leaving the coast clear for more road building, since the
 public transport option is hardly considered at all. The road lobby has nothing to
 fear from the Green Tories.
 There is a more immediate political context in which the Conservative Party
 wants to look green. It needs a new post-Thatcher image. Yet its commitments to
 industry and agriculture leave it little room for manoeuvre when it wrestles with
 questions of environmental regulation. In TCI, the Government places its cards on
 the table and enjoins debate. Geographers, biogeographers and ecologists should
 take up the challenge.
 Department of Geography, G. KEARNS
 University of Liverpool,
 P.O. Box 147, Liverpool L69 3BX, U.K.
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